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RENE V. MGM GRAND HOTEL, INC.,
305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002)
FACTS
The MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada employed Medina
Rene, an openly gay man, as a butler on an exclusive floor of the hotel.' The
floor on which he worked hosted an all-male staff.2 During his two-year
tenure at the hotel, plaintiffs co-workers and supervisor subjected him to
daily harassment.3  The harassment included telling jokes, calling the
plaintiff names like "mufieca" ("doll"), and subjecting him to pictures of two
men having sex . Rene testified that his harassers would caress his bottom
and shoulders, hug him from behind, "like a man holds a woman," and grab
his crotch and push their fingers against his anus through his clothing.' Rene
believed that his sexual orientation motivated the harassment. 6
In June 1996, the plaintiff filed a charge with the Nevada Equal
Rights Commission alleging discrimination based on his male sex. Ten
months later, he filed a Title VII claim in federal district court alleging
sexual harassment. 8
MGM filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that sexual
orientation does not serve as a basis on which a plaintiff may seek relief
under Title VII.9 The district court concluded that the plaintiff failed to state
a valid claim and granted the hotel's motion. '0
HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit, in a 7-4 decision," held that an openly gay
employee subjected to severe physical harassment of a sexual nature in the
workplace may have a valid sex discrimination claim under Title VII. tI
Whether sexual orientation fueled the harassment remains irrelevant to the
claim.
3
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ANALYSIS
Citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,' 4 Judge Fletcher
established that Title VII protects individuals from sexual harassment created
by a hostile work environment.' 5 In Meritor, the Court identified three
elements that a plaintiff must prove to establish a hostile work environment
claim: 1) that the plaintiff was "subjected to "physical conduct of a sexual
nature," 2) that this conduct was unwelcome, and 3) that the conduct was
sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment."'' 6 Judge Fletcher
applied this rubric to Rene's facts and concluded that MGM fostered a
hostile work environment for the plaintiff.' 7 The court pointed out that the
objectively offensive nature of Rene's claims allowed him to survive
summary judgment despite his sexual orientation, which bears no weight in a
hostile work environment claim under the statute.'"
To reiterate its assertion, the court reasoned that the alleged harassers
did not touch Rene's elbow or eye but rather grabbed his bottom and
crotch.' 9 The court noted that other courts have reviewed many cases
determining whether certain behavior amounts to harassment.20 It found that
several courts consistently forbade physical sexual assault as Title VII sexual
harassment.2 ' Judge Fletcher referred to several cases that illustrate
prohibited behavior.22 Based on those selected cases, prohibited behavior
may include grabbing testicles and flicking groin, patting buttocks, and
groping and shoving a broom handle in the crotch.23 Judge Fletcher adopted
the reasoning of these cases by concluding that when a harasser touches a
harassee's genitals, the court must recognize the link such behavior has to the
harassee's gender.24
The district court had held that Rene's claim did not succeed because
he argued that his co-workers targeted him because of his sexual orientation,
although the merits of his case were otherwise sound.25 Judge Fletcher
pointed out that this is not law; the sexual orientation of the victim remains
14 Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
15 Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002).









24 1d. at 1066.
25 id.
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irrelevant in determining that such offensive behavior violates Title VII.
2 6
Judge Fletcher contended that the plaintiffs sexual orientation remains
irrelevant for both male and female victims. 27  The offensive touching
functions as the condition within the work environment that constitutes
hostility "because of sex.",28 The targeting of body parts linked to plaintiff's
sexuality serves as the connection between the offensive touching and the
"because of sex" provision of Title VII. 29 Why the harassers behave the way
they do toward the victim remains irrelevant.3 °
The court relied on Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. 31 as
the basis for its conclusion.32 The plurality primarily focused on two
propositions from Oncale to guide its conclusion in Rene that severe or
pervasive same-sex physical touching falls under Title VlI's protection and
that even within a same-sex work environment, offensive sexual touching is
discrimination.33 In addressing the first principle, Judge Fletcher explained
that Title VII "forbids severe or pervasive same-sex offensive sexual
touching." 34 In Oncale, the Supreme Court reasoned that although Congress,
in enacting Title VII, did not specifically target male-on-male sexual
harassment, statutes often go beyond the specific evil for which they were
enacted to cover comparable evils. 35 Simply because a person belongs to one
group does not mean that they will not target other members of their same
class for harassment.36
Judge Fletcher then pointed out that pursuant to Oncale, same-sex
touching provides a viable discrimination claim under Title VII. 3 7 However,
in an all-male workplace, discrimination must be because of an individual's
sex.38 When a victim, such as Rene, finds himself subjected to offensive
touching in the workplace to which others are not, such behavior by the
harassers constitutes discrimination. 9 In such a situation, the plaintiff need
26 Id.
27 id.
28 Id. (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1991)).
29 ld.
30 id.
31 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
32 Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).
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only show that he faced discrimination "in comparison to the other men"
with whom he worked.40
The plurality opinion concluded that the plaintiff presented a valid
clear-cut sexual harassment claim.4 The court stated that because Title VII
prohibits severe or pervasive physical conduct of a sexual nature, the sexual
nature of the act subjects the act to Title VII analysis. 42 Title VII does not
preclude a claim where the conduct is carried out by harassers of the same
gender of the harassee, and "it prohibits such conduct without regard to the
sexual orientation-real or perceived-of the victim.
43
CONCURRING OPINIONS
Judge Pregerson's concurring opinion reached the same result as
the plurality opinion; however, Pregerson relied primarily on Nichols v.
Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.," a harassment action based on gender
stereotyping. The concurrence also relied on Oncale for the premise that
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. 45  The factual
similarity of Nichols to Rene allowed the concurrence to conclude that for
the same reasons that Title VII bars sex stereotyping in Nichols, Title VII
bars sex stereotyping in the plaintiffs claim.
46
Judge Graber, concurred with the court's result but wrote
separately.47 Judge Graber agreed with the plurality opinion's reliance on
Oncale and its conclusion that Title VII precluded summary judgment in
both Oncale and Rene.48 Graber agreed with the dissent on two issues that
the plurality did not reach: first, that discrimination on based sexual
orientation does not constitute a valid Title VII claim, and second, Rene
failed to argue the sexual stereotyping theory.49
In the final concurrence, Judge Fisher agreed with Judge Fletcher
and Judge Pregerson and argued that both Oncale and Nichols applied to the
plaintiff's claim.50 By looking at the nature of the physical attacks, Rene's
40 id.
41 Id. at 1068
42 id.
43 id.
4Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that verbal abuse based
on same-sex gender stereotyping by gay plaintiffs co-workers entitled plaintiff to Title VII protection
based on sex stereotyping, because taunting was directed at plaintiff because of his sex).
45 Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002).
46 id at 1068-69.
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claim that he suffered discrimination because of his sex remained sound
under Judge Fletcher's approach.' The instances when plaintiffs co-
workers accused him of feminine behavior constituted harassment based on
sexual stereotyping under Judge Pregerson's approach. 2
DISSENTING OPINIONS
In his dissent, Judge Hug argued that Judge Fletcher incorrectly
interpreted Oncale by asserting that a plaintiff subjected to pervasive, severe
unwelcome physical harassment of a sexual nature maintains a valid claim
under Title VII. 53 The dissent argued that a plaintiff in a valid Title VII
discrimination claim has to assert that the discrimination occurred because of
the plaintiff's gender.5 4 Claims based on physical touching generally are not
actionable under Title VII, unless such action is because of a person's race,
color, sex, religion, or national origin.5 5 Harassment based on characteristics
other than those enumerated in the statute, such as sexual orientation, are not
protected under Title VII.56  Sexual stereotyping in the workplace is
actionable under Title VII.5 7 However, one's activity outside the job does
not serve as a basis for gender stereotyping under Title VII according to
Judge Hug's interpretation of the statute. 8
Although MGM created a hostile work environment, the plaintiffs
coworkers did not harass him because of his sex, rather the harassment
stemmed from his sexual orientation. 9  Yet, the plaintiff incorrectly
interpreted Oncale to stand for the proposition that Title VII's bar on same-
sex harassment impliedly protects against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.60 The plaintiff must prove that the harassment was
discriminatory because of the harasee's sex.6' Judge Hug argued that the
Oncale court held that same-sex harassment, not offensive physical touching
of a sexual nature, constitutes a Title VII claim.62 Evidence of that
interpretation lies in the fact that the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
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gender.63 Judge Hug concluded that Rene received different treatment
because of his sexual orientation, not because of his sex. 
4
Judge Hug stated that the Oncale court described three ways that
same sex harassment because of gender is actionable under Title VII: 1) the
harassment is based on sexual desire and evidence shows that the harasser is
gay, 2) the harasser possesses a general hostility against the presence of men
in the workplace, or 3) in a mixed-sex workplace, the plaintiff may offer
evidence of how the harasser treated members of both sexes.6 5 Judge Hug
argued that Rene failed to present any evidence supporting any of these three
approaches.66
The dissent also relied on recent cases that hold that Title VII does
not protect discrimination based on sexual orientation.67 If sexual orientation
had meant to be classified under the Title VII, Congress would have taken
measures to ensure the inclusion of this class, but it has not.68
Judge Hug then turned to the concurrence's argument that the co-
workers subjected plaintiff sexual stereotyping, a claim that receives Title
VII protection. 9 Looking to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins70 and Nichols to
support that assertion, Judge Hug stated that the plaintiff had a valid sex
stereotyping claim but had failed to raise that argument in district court.7'
The plaintiff failed to say that his effeminate behavior or other non-
traditional male characteristics served as the reason for the discrimination.72
The plaintiff did not make a sexual stereotyping claim; rather he relied
consistently on sexual orientation as the reason for the harassment, which
does not serve as an actionable claim under Title VII.
73
CONCLUSION
Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. confirms two propositions. First,
based on the Oncale "because of sex" standard, an openly gay plaintiff
subjected to pervasive, unwanted, same-sex, physical touching of a sexual
nature may have a valid claim under Title VII.74 Second, an openly gay
63 id.
64id.
65 Id. at 1074-75
6Id. at 1075.67 
id.
6' Id. at 1076.
69 id.
70 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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plaintiff may have a valid cause of action under Title VII by relying on
gender conformity as the basis for the contested discrimination.75 These
arguments provide solid ammunition for gay and lesbian individuals
subjected to sexual harassment who otherwise have no class protection under
Title VII. Although the decision creates much needed precedent in the
struggle for protection of gays, lesbians, and gender non-conformists, Rene
does not provide a sweeping change in Title VII's protections for these
groups.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services artfully stretches the intent behind the Supreme Court's ruling in
that case. In Oncale, Justice Scalia held that an employee sexually harassed
by someone of his same-sex may bring a valid claim of "discriminat[ion]...
because of ... sex" under Title VII.76 He suggested that the presence of
pervasive harassment may create a hostile work environment, but
discrimination "because of sex" must also accompany the harassment. v The
Ninth Circuit took his analysis a step further. It created a much needed
nexus between certain physical harassment and the protected Title VII
classification when a gay or lesbian individual faces harassment. Although
the plaintiff in Rene claimed that his sexual orientation provided the reason
for the discrimination and harassment he suffered, the Ninth Circuit stressed
that the manner in which his co-workers harassed him actually spoke to his
sex. The Supreme Court, however, may see this decision as an attempt to
fashion Title VII protection based on sexual orientation.
In Oncale, Justice Scalia stressed several times that "sex" does not
encompass any other classification beyond gender, i.e., does not include
sexual orientation.78 He instructed courts to interpret his Oncale opinion
through the lens of common sense and sensitivity to social context.7 9 Based
on the unfavorable legislative and judicial history of sexual orientation
protection, one cannot anticipate with confidence that the Supreme Court
would uphold the Ninth Circuit's interpretation "because of sex" if accepted
for review. If Rene stands, courts applying this analysis will likely stress that
sexual orientation remains irrelevant to a title VII claim. Overall, this
perspective provides a useful roadmap when bringing similar claims against
employers.
The argument that the plaintiff's co-workers subjected him to
harassment based on sexual stereotyping serves as a solid means by which to
75 id.
76 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998).
77See id. at 80-81.
78 See id.79 See id. at 82.
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bring a sexual harassment claim for some gay and lesbian individuals.
Although harassment based on sexual stereotyping may provide a proxy for
sexual orientation, if the court can palate a discrimination claim based on
stereotyping moie than it can palate a direct claim based on sexual
orientation, plaintiffs should embrace it. Unfortunately, gays and lesbians
who do not project stereotypical traits of the opposite gender will find
themselves without further protection from the Ninth Circuit ruling. People
targeted simply for their sexual orientation by a harasser who omits reference
to "atypical" gender behavior may also find little assistance from Rene.
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